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Introduction: Why is Change so Hard? 
8QGHUVWDQGLQJ &RQWLQXLW\ LQ %DUDFN 2EDPD¶V )RUHLJQ
Policy 
 
Jack Holland 
 
 
µ7KHJOREDOZDURQWHUURULVGHDGORQJOLYH³RYHUVHDVFRQWLQJHQF\RSHUDWLRQV´¶
(Burkemann 2009, also cited in Holland 2012: 173) 
 
This book addresses a pressing, contemporary puzzle, which reflects enduring debates 
in the discipline of International Relations and the social sciences more generally.  
Why has a president elected on a platform of change pursued such a high degree of 
continuity in his foreign and security policy?  The answer is neither simple nor clear-
cut.  To understand continuity in American foreign policy after 2008, it is necessary 
WR FRQVLGHU 2EDPD¶V UROH DV D VWUDWHJLF DJHQW DQG WKH FKDOOHQJLQJ QDWXUH RI WKH
strategically selective context in which he operates.  How should we conceptualise 
this context?  Does it include relative American decline within the international 
V\VWHP DQ LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHG µ:DU RQ 7HUURU¶ and culturally deep-rooted discourses, 
established in the aftermath of September 11th 2001?  How should we conceptualise 
2EDPD¶V DELOLW\ WRDFWZLWKLQ VXFKDFRQWH[WKRZHYHUXQGHUVWRRG" +DV2EDPDDW
times, actually opted for continuity, of his own volition?  This book grapples directly 
with fundamental questions of change and continuity such as these, in its exploration 
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RI86IRUHLJQSROLF\GXULQJ%DUDFN2EDPD¶VILUVWWHUPLQRIILFHIURP-DQXDU\
to January 2013. 
 
For a President elected upon an apparent platform of change, the foreign policy of the 
forty-fourth president has demonstrated a surprising degree of continuity with that of 
his predecessor, George W. Bush.  While many commentators will applaud this 
continuity (see, for example, Lynch and Singh 2008), with some going so far as to 
ODEHO 2EDPD¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ µQHRFRQVHUYDWLYH¶ 3RGKRUHW]  5LFKPDQ 
VXFKFRQWLQXLW\KDVEHHQ WURXEOLQJDQGXQH[SHFWHGIRUPDQ\RI2EDPD¶VVXSSRUWHUV
and less partisan, independent observers.  Why then might Obama, elected on an 
apparent platform of change, have implemented a foreign policy that continued 
VLJQLILFDQWHOHPHQWVRIKLVSUHGHFHVVRU¶V"7KLVERRNZHLJKVXSWKHSRVVLELOLWLHVWKDW
Obama: declined to implement greater change because he was ideologically opposed 
to it from the outset; failed to appreciate the demands of holding office whilst 
campaigning and adjusted accordingly once elected; and was structurally limited in 
the change that was possible.  While the contributors to this volume find evidence for 
all of these explanations, the bulk of their arguments coalesce around the last.  This 
book then, in large part, is an exploration of the structural limits to change for 
American foreign policy generally and associated political, social and economic 
disincentives to end the War on Terror specifically. 
 
There is certainly truth in the notion that Obama spoke of far less extensive change 
than his supporters frequently and mistakenly heard (McCrisken 2011), and that on 
taking office, like all presidents, he quickly adapted from campaigning in poetry to 
governing in prose.  However, his worldview and accounting for the realities of the 
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Oval Office tell only a small part of the story.  Obama has been unable to institute 
greater change because of the enduring structures of the international system, War on 
Terror and the domestic cultural and political landscape within which he is located.  
These structures take a variety of forms, the most significant of which decrease in 
scale from: the relative material declining of American power; the institutionalised 
nature of the µ:DU RQ 7HUURU¶ DQG WKH KHJHPRQLF GLVFRXUVHV RI 7HUURU WKDW ZHUH
established shortly after 9/11 and continue to be defended today (e.g. Boyle 2011; 
Croft 2006; Jackson 2011; Krebs 2005; Krebs and Jackson 2007; Krebs and Lobasz 
2007; Holland 2012a, 2013; Holland and Jarvis 2013; Quinn 2011).  This book brings 
some of these arguments together in order to highlight their competing understandings 
and explanations of continuity, as well as to reveal their significant and 
underappreciated areas of agreement.  
 
In order to introduce contemporary debates on change and continuity in American 
foreign policy, including the contributions that follow, this introduction is structured 
in two principal parts.  First, drawing on recent literature and the chapters that follow, 
the introduction asks a theoretical question ± µKRZFDQFRQWLQXLW\LQ$PHULFDQIRUHLJQ
SROLF\ EH XQGHUVWRRG"¶ ± exploring the ways in which, in both international and 
domestic arenas, assessments of continuity and its drivers are contested.  It is argued 
WKDW 2EDPD¶V PL[HG UHFRUG RI UHRULHQWLQJ 86 IRUHLJQ SROLF\ SUHVHQWV LPSRUWDQW
implications for two enduring debates at the heart of the philosophy of social science: 
the relationship between structure and agency; and conceptualisations of time and 
temporality.  Second, the chapter asks an empirical question ± µWR ZKDW H[WHQW KDV
WKHUH EHHQ FKDQJH LQ $PHULFDQ IRUHLJQ SROLF\ XQGHU 2EDPD"¶  +HUH ZH FRQVLGHU
2EDPD¶V IRUHLJQSROLF\ DQGFRXQWHU-terrorism strategy substantively, in the areas of 
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war, intervention and nuclear weapons.  Together, in bringing together theoretical and 
empirical explorations of volition and temporality in US foreign policy, the 
introduction and the book as a whole consider how we might think about and 
conceptualise change, both in the broadest sense, with implications for the social 
VFLHQFHVDQG,5DVZHOODVZLWKLQ2EDPD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\VSHFLILFDOO\ 
 
 
2%$0$¶6)25(,*132/,&<81'(567$1',1*&217,18,7<,17+(
WAR ON TERROR 
How might we make sense of Obama ± elected on an apparent platform of change ± 
pursuing such a high degree of continuity with the foreign and security policy of the 
%XVK$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ"2EDPD¶VPL[HGUHFRUGRQGHOLYHULQJFKDQJHSRVHVLPSRUWDQW
questions, both for understandings of American foreign policy and for major debates 
in International Relations and the social sciences more broadly.  Three options are 
explored here, the first of which can be understood as volitional and the final two as 
structural explanations of continuity.  First, the argument is put forward that Obama 
was in fact consistent with his election rhetoric; the expectation of greater change 
arose through a willing mishearing on the part of his supporters.  This argument 
represents Obama as the master of his own foreign policy, opting to steer a steady 
course for the United States.  Second, several structural limits to change are 
presented, beginning with broadly neorealist and neoclassical realist arguments, 
stressing the declining relative material capability of the US in an increasingly multi-
polar international system.  To this, a range of broadly constructivist arguments are 
added, which explore how the institutionalisation of Bush-era policies has limited 
2EDPD¶V RSWLRQV  7KLV LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVDWLRQ IRFXVHV RQ WKH %XVK-era ideas and 
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identities at the heart of the War on Terror, alongside their material and economic 
consequences.  The result of this broadly critical constructivist argument is that 
Obama remains the victim of dominant discourses and a kind of cultural coercion, 
with the narrative deck stacked against the possibility of achieving greater change in 
American foreign and security policy.    
 
Choice and Re-assessment: Obama as author of foreign policy continuity 
The first explanation for continuity in American foreign policy under Obama is that 
he has in fact been consistent with ninety per cent of his election rhetoric; it was just 
misheard by some voters and especially ardent supporters.  The argument, succinctly, 
is that Obama never intended nor promised wholesale reversal of Bush era foreign 
policy.  In Chapter 1, Trevor McCrisken draws on his earlier work to make this point 
explicitly and persuasively:  
 
µ7KRVHH[SHFWLQJZKROHVDOHFKDQJHVWR86FRXQWHUWHUURULVPSROLF\«PLVUHDG
2EDPD¶VLQWHQWLRQV2EDPDDOZD\VLQWHQGHGWRGHHSHQ%XVK¶VFRPPLWPHQWWR
FRXQWHUWHUURULVP ZKLOH DW WKH VDPH WLPH HQGLQJ WKH µGLVWUDFWLRQ¶ RI WKH ,UDT
ZDU¶ 
(2011: 781) 
 
0F&ULVNHQDUJXHVWKDW2EDPD¶VHOHFWLRQUKHWRULFGLGQRWVXJJHVWHQGLQJWKH:DURQ
7HUURUDQGUHYHUVLQJ%XVK¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\EXWUDWKHUFRPSrised of the twin aims to 
ILJKWEHWWHUDQGFOHDQHU7KHVHZHUHµVWUDWHJLFFKDQJHV¶UDWKHUWKDQZKROHVDOHSROLF\
reversal (2011: 782).  For McCrisken, while it is clear that Obama has gone through 
the realisation that all new presidents do ± µJRYHUQPHQWLVGLIIHUHQWIURPRSSRVLWLRQ¶± 
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there are two compelling reasons that explain why Obama has opted ± of his own 
volition ± WRGHOLYHURQO\µIDOWHULQJFKDQJH¶)LUVWµObama foreshadowed 
much of his programme in his pre-election speeches; yet audiences were selective in 
what they heard, displaying a strange kind of psychological dissonance. Second, few 
have appreciated how much the Bush strategy was quietly modified in the last three 
\HDUV EHIRUH 2EDPD¶V DFFHVVLRQ« 2EDPD KDV DGRSWHG D FRXQWHUWHUURrism strategy 
that is late-Bush rather than early-Bush. He has introduced some significant changes 
of his own, but even these were in the spirit of the adaptations that were already under 
ZD\¶ 0F&ULVNHQ    )RU 0F&ULVNHQ WKHQ LW LV RI OLWWOH VXUprise that 
continuity is apparent; it should have been expected.  And, moreover, where change 
has been pursued, it was usually with Bush, rather than Obama, that it originated.   
 
On the first claim ± that Obama was heard to talk of greater change than he actually 
promised ± ZHFDQUHYLVLW WKHNH\IRUHLJQSROLF\VSHHFKHVRIWKHFDPSDLJQ µ:KLOH
on the campaign trail, Obama portrayed himself as an antidote to the excesses of the 
%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶0F&ULVNHQ7KHZRUGH[FHVVLVLPSRUWDQWKHUH  It 
was not that Obama promised to end the War on Terror, but instead pledged to rein 
back those most intrusive, ill advised and dangerous overreaches of an increasingly 
imperial presidency, founded upon the foreign policy of war in exceptional times.  
OnHYHU\SODXVLEOHSRVVLELOLW\ LV WKDW2EDPD¶V WHQGHQF\ WRGUDZVRIUHTXHQWO\DQG
intensely upon the language of change helped to generate the misleading assumption 
that wholesale change would be pursued on his election to the White House.  For 
instance, in one campaign speech, at the Ronald Reagan Building in Washington DC, 
2EDPDXVHGWKHZRUGµFKDQJH¶RQILYHWLPHVDQGWKHZRUGµQHZ¶QRIHZHUWKDQWKLUW\-
two occasions.  A closer reading of his speech, however, reveals a far more limited 
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and nuanced policy SRVLWLRQ  2EDPD GLG LQVLVW µI am running for President of the 
8QLWHG 6WDWHV WR OHDG WKLV FRXQWU\ LQ D QHZ GLUHFWLRQ¶ 2EDPD   %XW WKH
following line made clear that this was a strategy of fighting better and smarter; it was 
about correctly identifying and confronting threats, not delivering wholesale change: 
µ,QVWHDG RI EHLQJ GLVWUDFWHG IURP WKH PRVW SUHVVLQJ WKUHDWV WKDW ZH IDFH , ZDQW WR
RYHUFRPH WKHP¶ 2EDPD   2EDPD EHQHILWHG KRZHYHU IURP IRVWHULQJ D
perception of change amongst voters that was greater than his actual intentions.  From 
WKHHDUO\GD\VRIKLVFDPSDLJQKHDUJXHGµI'm not running for President to conform 
WR:DVKLQJWRQ
VFRQYHQWLRQDOWKLQNLQJ«,
PUXQQLQJWRFKDQJHRXUSROLWLFVDQGRXU
policy so we can leave the world a beWWHU SODFH WKDQ RXU JHQHUDWLRQ KDV IRXQG LW¶
(Obama 2007). 
 
While it is certainly true that some supporters heard a greater case for change than 
was actually delivered, in other areas it appears that Obama has outright failed to 
realise the change he did seek.  His apparent inability to close the detention facility at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, stands out as the clearest example of these failings.  Obama 
was elected having campaigned to shut Guantanamo and, on taking office, signed 
executive orders for the detenWLRQIDFLOLW\¶VFORVXUHDVZHOODVIRUELGGLQJWKHXVHRI
torture by the United States.  As David Cameron has recently remarked, Obama came 
to power and effectively hit the moral reset button on the policies and perceptions of 
the United States (Winnett 2012).  Yet, with around one hundred detainees still at 
*XDQWDQDPR 2EDPD¶V SURPLVHV RI FKDQJH KDYH FOHDUO\ EHHQ OLPLWHG LQ WKHLU
realisation.  It appears that he has failed to reconcile the demands of fighting terrorism 
with the values and ideals of America, as he promised he would.  How then might we 
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H[SODLQ D YROLWLRQDO FRQWLQXLW\ WKDW FRQWUDGLFWV HOHPHQWV RI 2EDPD¶V FDPSDLJQ
rhetoric, as well as the urgency of his initial actions on assuming the presidency? 
 
One answer is that Obama has effectively reined himself in, as all politicians do, on 
making the transition from candidate, through President Elect, to Commander in 
&KLHI$V0F&ULVNHQDUJXHVµKLVUKHWRULFKDVEHHQUHFRQVWLWXWHGDVKLV
SROLF\KDVEHHQWUDQVODWHGLQWRDFWLRQ¶ +DYLQJIDFed terrorist plots against his own 
LQDXJXUDWLRQ DQG WKH µ&KULVWPDV 'D\ SORW¶ DW WKH HQG RI KLV ILUVW \HDU LQ RIILFH
2EDPD¶VODQJXDJHEHFDPHRSHQO\PRUHPDUWLDOZLWKWDONRIµZDU¶UHPLQLVFHQWRIKLV
SUHGHFHVVRU 0F&ULVNHQ    $SSHDOV WR µZDU¶ DQG recollections of 9/11 as 
justification for the continuation of the campaign in Afghanistan increased in response 
WRWKHµQHDUPLVVHV¶RIIDLOHGWHUURULVWSORWVDJDLQVWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV7KLVDUJXPHQW
suggests that, on becoming president, Obama was gradually and increasingly 
converted to the cause and rationale of Bush-era counter-terrorism policy.   
 
&RQWUD-DFNVRQDQG&KDSWHU0F&ULVNHQDUJXHVWKDWWKHµFRQWLQXLWLHVLQ86
FRXQWHUWHUURULVP GR QRW LQGLFDWH WKDW 2EDPD LV WUDSSHG E\ %XVK¶V LQVWLWXtionalized 
construction of a global war on terror so much as that he shares a conception of the 
imperative of reducing the terrorist threat to the US, as demonstrated by his pursuit 
and elimination of the Al-4DHGD OHDGHU 2VDPD ELQ /DGHQ¶  2EDPD¶V ZDU DJDLnst 
WHUURULVPLVµLQNHHSLQJZLWKWKHDVVXPSWLRQVDQGSULRULWLHVRIWKHODVWWHQ\HDUV¶$QG
LW LV µMXVW DV SUREOHPDWLF¶ 0F&ULVNHQ    $FFRUGLQJ WR WKLV YROLWLRQDO
argument, these policies and their problematic elements have come about because 
Obama chose them, either on the campaign trail, or on realizing how difficult change 
is to achieve, as he learned first hand the challenges of being President of the United 
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States. This choice was initially ideological, but has, in more recent times, arisen from 
the realities of American politics, the context of the moment and the Office, and the 
resultant re-assessment of the ends and means of pursuing the national interest.  
 
Systemic Decline: The constraints of decreasing relative material capability 
In CKDSWHU  $GDP 4XLQQ DUJXHV WKDW 2EDPD¶V SUHVLGHQF\ LV OHVV GHILQHG E\ WKH
difficulties of his adjustment to occupying the White House than his ability to 
reconcile foreign policy with long-term material decline.  While Nicholas Kitchen, in 
Chapter 3, affords a greater role to individuals within the Obama administration, these 
are fundamental underpinning sentiments with which he wholeheartedly concurs; the 
LPSRUWDQFH RI WKH µSLYRW WR $VLD¶ LQ 2EDPD¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ HYLGHQFHV WKHVH
inexorable trends.  For both authors, the brute material fact that is the amount of 
power wielded by the United States serves as an inescapable reality confronting 
Obama as he decides how best to deploy it.  For Quinn, the twin stories of American 
long- to mid-term decline and ObaPD¶V VKRUW-term policy options are happily 
complementary at present.  The US is fortunate to possess a president aware of 
declining national power and adopting an outlook which accounts for that fact.  In 
short, Obama is helping the United States to decline politely, in detaching America 
from prolonged struggles, leading from behind (Lizza 2010), establishing clear 
parameters to international involvement and attempting to prevent indefinite 
HQWDQJOHPHQWV DQG RYHUUHDFK  7KLV µPHDVXUHG FDXWLRXV¶ DSSURDFK WR US foreign 
policy and the synchronicity it demonstrates with the cold, hard and potentially 
painful reality of relative material decline should be welcomed (see also Quinn 2011: 
804).  Kitchen, however, warns that DOLJQLQJ WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶ UHVRXUFHVZLWh new 
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strategic priorities will be a particularly difficult task over the coming years and 
decades. 
 
From Paul Kennedy, through Kishore Mahbubani, to Fareed Zakaria, Quinn traces the 
intellectual history of American decline, which has today returned with a vengeance.  
7KHµVHULRXVLQWHUQDOSUREOHPV¶RIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV4XLQQDUJXHVKDYH
EHHQFRPSRXQGHGE\WKHµVWULGHV«PDGHE\RWKHUQDWLRQV¶$µGLUHILVFDOVLWXDWLRQ¶
ZLOOLQVSLUHDµZDVWLQJ¶RIPLOLWDU\VXSHULRULW\4XLQQ.UHSLQHvich 2009).  
For the pessimistic (neo)realist then, the real debate is not whether the United States 
will experience relative decline or not, but rather on what timescale this decline will 
occur.  As Quinn points out, even the most ardent defenders of AmerLFD¶VVXSUHPDF\
tend to qualify their confident outlook with footnotes assuring the slow shift of power 
between states.  For Quinn and Kitchen, the need for a miraculous and unforeseen 
invention to stave of this decline is a wilder bet than the extrapolation of declinist 
scholars (Quinn 2011: 810).   
 
2EDPD¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ ZKHWKHU E\ KDSS\ FRLQFLGHQFH RU FRQVFLRXV FKRLFH KDV
necessarily been shaped by the shifting reality of American power.  Stretched to 
capacity by fighting two consecutive wars, Obama has demonstrated caution, 
UHOXFWDQFH DQG HYHQ UHWLFHQFH LQ GHFLVLRQV WR GHSOR\ $PHULFD¶V DUPHG IRUFHV
2EDPD¶V µadoption of a strategy of restraint and circumspection in the use of 
$PHULFDQSRZHU¶SDUDOOHOV WKHEOXQWDQGLQFRQWURYHUWLEOHIDFW WKDW$PHULFDQ relative 
capability is in decline (Quinn 2011: 814).  Obama pursues a balancing act in foreign 
policy, between doing enough and not too much.  It is the Goldilocks approach 
(Miller 2012).  +LVUHDFWLRQWRWKH$UDE6SULQJZDVDFDVHLQSRLQWDVKHWULHGµto get 
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RQWKHULJKWVLGHRIKLVWRULFSROLWLFDOFKDQJH¶EXWXQGHUVWRRGµWKDW:DVKLQJWRQ
VUROH
and influence really aren't determinative anymore. Obama seems to understand 
intuitively that if you stand in the way of history's power you'll likely get run over by 
LW¶  +H KDV WKHUHIRUH RSHUDWHG µIURP WKH VLGHOLQHV VXSSRUWLQJ FKDQJH LQ (J\SW
<HPHQDQG7XQLVLDSUHFLVHO\ZKHUH$PHULFDEHORQJHG¶0LOOHU,Q6\ULDDQG
Mali, we see these trends continue into his second term in office.   
 
The arguments puW IRUZDUG LQ FKDSWHUV  DQG  GRZQSOD\ WKH UROH RI 2EDPD¶V
volitional desire to achieve change in the face of systemic shifts in the global 
distribution of power, which the War on Terror has made all too apparent through the 
quagmire in Iraq and difficulties of pursuing asymmetric warfare in Afghanistan.  For 
Quinn and Kitchen it is the structural pressures of the international system that 
ultimately drive issues of change and continuity in American foreign policy, over and 
above the current occupant of the White House.  Most recently, these systemic 
pressures have manifest in military reminders that the US cannot do everything, as 
well as inspiring the subsequent political pressures of public opinion, increasingly 
frustrated by the apparently intractable and futile campaigns of the War on Terror.  
For Quinn and Kitchen, then, where change might occur, it is most likely driven by 
structure, not agency, which will ultimately, and in turn, require a re-alignment of 
policy with power.  In this task, Quinn applauGV2EDPD¶VDELOLW\WRZRUNZLWKUDWKHU
than rage against the apparent dying of the light, and Kitchen notes the increased 
importance of American foreign policy and diplomacy in Asia, which necessarily 
UHOHJDWHV$PHULFD¶VLQWHUHVWVLQWKH*UHDWHU0LGGOH(DVt.   
 
 12 
Ideas, Identity and Institutionalisation: Dominant discourse and cultural 
coercion  
Notwithstanding the 2008 financial crisis, American expenditure on the War on 
Terror has been nothing short of phenomenal.  Official congressional estimates cost 
the War on Terror at over 1.5 trillion US dollars.  The cost of running the detention 
facility at Guantanamo alone is enormous.  Despite its promised closure, each of the 
IDFLOLW\¶VRQHKXQGUHGGHWDLQHHVFRQWLQXHWRFRVWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQQXDOO\
(Van Veeren 2012).  And these figures focus only upon the public costs of fighting 
DQG GHWDLQLQJ µWHUURULVWV¶  7KH\ GR QRW DFFRXQW IRU WKH GRPHVWLF H[SHQGLWXUH RQ
counter-terrorism efforts, nor the considerable sums of private money invested in 
fighting terror at home and abroad.   
 
Alongside the eye-watering economics of fighting terror, perhaps it is the 
establishment of the Department of Homeland Security that best encompasses the 
reorientation of American government around the counter-terrorism effort.  After 9-
11, Bush promised a radical overhaul of American security architecture ± analogous 
WR 7UXPDQ¶V JHDULQJ XS WR ILJKW DQG ZLQ WKH &ROG :DU ± around the remodelled 
Department of Defense and National Security Council.  These once-in-a-generation 
shifts can, unsurprisingly, require a generational timescale to revisit and alter.  In 
2002, Bush increased the budget for Homeland Security to $38 billion, as, after 9-11, 
µWHUURU¶ EHFDPH µWKH QHZ RUJDQLVDWLRQDO SULRULW\¶ LQ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV &URIW 
125).  Croft argues persuasively that contained within the four aims of the new 
Department for Homeland Security was the clear sense that the country was at war, 
against an enemy prepared to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and against 
whom it was necessary to plan based on a worst-case analysis.  As Richard Jackson 
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argues in Chapter 4, these underpinning assumptions of institutional reorganisation 
were vital.  New spending and policy priorities enshrined their importance, helping to 
establish them as political truth.  Their institutionalisation, through spending, policy 
reviews and new government departments, helped to minimise the possibility of their 
contestation, as they became sufficiently taken for granted to constitute a form of 
tacitly accepted, but barely acknowledged, background knowledge.  
 
µ7KH SROLF\ SURJUDPPH WKDW IROORZHG IURP WKH ZDU RQ WHUURU « DIIHFWHG SROLWLFDO
OHJDO HFRQRPLF DQG VRFLDO DVSHFWV RI OLIH LQ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV¶ &URIW  
And importantly, as Croft (2006), Jackson (2005) and Holland (2012) have argued, it 
impacted on everyday life for many Americans.  The publicity of frequent arrests of 
suspected terrorists located in America ± the enemy within; the sleeper cell ± helped 
to sustain a sense of perpetual and insidious threat.  Institutionalisation, in short, 
played out at the micro level of everyday life for millions of Americans.  Increased 
airport security measures, more strenuous visa checks, stricter immigration controls 
and new screenings for entering many public buildings, were just some of the range of 
counter-terrorism measures that American citizens funded, broadly supported, and 
were exposed to on a daily basis as a constant reminder of the terror threat.   
 
The institutionalisation of the War on Terror, however, was it its most obvious, 
dramatic and impactful at the level of defence expenditure.  First, the 2002 National 
Defense Authorisation Act raised and reoriented spending in order to fight the new 
threats of the War on Terror.  Second, the 2003 budget, Bush proudly announced, 
PDUNHGµWKHELJJHVWLQFUHDVHLQGHIHQVHVSHQGLQJLQWZHQW\\HDUV¶%XVK7KLV
refocusing of American efforts and finances around the effort to find, confront and 
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GHIHDW µWHUURU¶ DQ\ZKHUH DQG HYHU\ZKHUH ZRXOG SURYH YHU\ GLIILFXOW to pull back 
from.  Alongside the president and vice-president, Donald Rumsfeld was a key figure 
LQWKLVSURFHVVKHOSLQJWRHQVXUHWKDW$PHULFD¶VDUPHGIRUFHVZHUHHTXLSSHGWRILJKW
DJDLQVWWRGD\¶VWHUURULVWVUDWKHUWKDQWKH&ROG:DUIRHVRIROG5XPVIHld justified the 
increasing cost of this programme against the impact of September 11th (see Croft 
2006: 138).  $378 billion dollars, Rumsfeld (2002) argued, whilst being a great deal of 
money, was an eminently sensible outlay, if the $170 billion estimated impact of 
September 11th was taken into account.  Paul Wolfowitz (2002, cited in Croft 2006: 
138) took this further still.  Against the potential cost of a WMD attack, he insisted, 
such investment would appear cheap.   
 
Obama is trimming the edges off of this institutionalised behemoth.  He has, for 
example, worked to overhaul the colour-coded advisory system.  It is, however, 
extremely difficult to curtail, let alone stop and reverse or redirect these gargantuan 
national security efforts.  It is more akin to turning around a battleship than a car, 
albeit on a far greater order of magnitude.  The fundamental orientation and mission 
of the key institutions of the War on Terror therefore remain very much in tact.  They 
are geared up, in a fashion reminiscent of the 1960s Garrison State, to fight and win a 
war, against a new and lethal enemy.  Of course, whether the lethality of this enemy is 
true in reality is up for debate.  The institutionalisation of the War on Terror has been 
achieved on the back of an exceptional investment in the discourses that underpin it.  
This discursive construction, as well as underpinning the formulation and financing of 
the war effort, is deeply engrained in American political culture.  It is sufficiently 
embedded to generate its own perpetual logic, alongside processes of fiscal and 
governmental institutionalisation.  
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Zalman and Clarke (2009: 110) have noted that, whilst campaigning for office, 
µ2EDPD¶V ZRUGV DQG DFWLRQV DLPHG WR SXQFWXUH WKH LQIODWHG GUDPD WKDW KDV
characterized the dominant discourses of the War on Terror. Rather than a battle to 
the death between the forces of good and evil, the war was to become a human-sized 
conflict between a state pledged to act in accordance with agreed rules of warfare and 
a reasonably well-GHILQHGDGYHUVDU\¶$QG\HWWKLVZDVDSUHPDWXUHRELWXDU\IRUWKH
War on Terror and its Bush era excesses.  Despite efforts to modify the underpinning 
ODQJXDJH RI WKH :DU RQ 7HUURU =DOPDQ DQG &ODUNH JR RQ WR QRWH WKDW µWKH EDVLF
contours of the original narrative, in which the United States conducts a worldwide 
campaign against a diverse collection of actors presumed to be united by a 
commitment to Islamic extremism, remains intact in key branches of the U.S. 
JRYHUQPHQW¶  Quinn (2011: 822-3) confirms that, despite initial attempts to move 
EH\RQG UHOLDQFH RQ ELQDULHV RI JRRG DQG HYLO DQ DQDO\VLV RI 2EDPD¶V SUHVLGHQWLDO
ODQJXDJH µGRHV QRW E\ DQ\ PHDQV UHSUHVHQW D UDGLFDO EUHDN ZLWK WKH WUDGLWLRQV RI
American foreign policy in the modern era. Examination of his major foreign policy 
pronouncements reveals that he remains within the mainstream of the American 
GLVFRXUVH RQ IRUHLJQ SROLF\¶  7KLV VXJJHVWV WZR WKLQJV  First, institutionalisation 
operates beyond policy directives and funding decisions; it includes discourse and 
QDUUDWLYH  ,Q &KDSWHU  5LFKDUG -DFNVRQ H[SORUHV WKH µways in which the war on 
WHUURUKDVEHHQLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHGLQFRXQWHUWHUURULVPSUDFWLFHVDQGLQVWLWXWLRQV¶DVZHOO
DVµKRZLWKDVEHHQQRUPDOLVHGDQGHPEHGGHGLQ$PHULFDQSRSXODUFXOWXUH¶WKURXJK
the narratives of 9-DQGWKHµQHJDWLYHLGHRJUDSKRIµWHUURULVP¶¶(see Jackson 2011: 
390). Second, it suggests that the dominant discourses of the War on Terror are 
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sufficiently socially embedded such that they possess a self-perpetuating logic from 
which it is difficult to break free.   
 
,Q&KDSWHU0LFKHOOH %HQWOH\ WUDFHV WKLV UKHWRULFDO FRHUFLRQ DUJXLQJ WKDW µObama 
cannot realistically implement any aspect of counter-terrorism policy in isolation of 
the culture of fear promoted by his predecessor. The frames and narratives of fear that 
KHKDVHIIHFWLYHO\ LQKHULWHG OLPLWKLP¶ VHHDOVR%HQWOH\  ,QRUGHU WRDFKLHYH
greater policy freedom, Obama is required to overcome or at least downplay these 
fears, but doing so risks projectinJDQLPDJHRIDSUHVLGHQWZKRLVµVRIW¶RQLVVXHVRI
national security.  As Bentley points out, narratives of fear are actually useful to 
Obama as he seeks to successfully implement his own vision of counter-terrorism 
strategy at home and abroad. However, 2EDPDµLVLQFDSDEOHRIFRQVWUXFWLQJWKDWIHDU
KRZHYHUKHZLVKHV¶%HQWOH\KHUHPDLQVWUDSSHGZLWKLQWKHSDUDPHWHUVRIKLV
SUHGHFHVVRU¶V FRQVWUXFWLRQ RI -11 and the War on Terror, which have now been 
resonant and repeated for over a decade.  
 
This sWUDQG RI FULWLFDO FRQVWUXFWLYLVP H[SORUHV WKH H[WHQW WR ZKLFK µcounter- 
WHUURULVPSROLF\FDQEHUHZULWWHQ¶E\WKH2EDPD$GPLQLVWUDWLRQLQYLHZRIWKHµsocial 
DQGSROLWLFDOFRQVWUXFWLRQRI86FRXQWHUWHUURULVPSROLF\¶ WKDWKDV WDNHQSODFHµVLQFH
the onset RI WKHZDURQ WHUURULVP¶ Jackson 2011: 390)  ,W DUJXHV WKDW WKH µFXOWXUDO
JUDPPDU H[SUHVVHG LQ WKH ODQJXDJH RI WKH ZDU RQ WHUURU¶ OLPLWV 2EDPD¶V DELOLW\ WR
achieve greater change in foreign and security policy, as well as potentially serving to 
limit hiVRZQGHVLUHIRUFKDQJH)RU-DFNVRQ2EDPD¶VSROLF\DQGODQJXDJHµDFFRUGV
ZLWKWKHGHHSFXOWXUDOJUDPPDURI$PHULFDQLGHQWLW\¶DQGWKHQRZµZHOO-established 
LGHRJUDSK¶RIWKH:DURQ7HUURU6XFFLQFWO\WKHDUJXPHQWVXJJHVWVWKDWWKH:DURQ
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Terror is undeUSLQQHGE\SDUWLFXODUGLVFRXUVHVZKLFKKDYHµEHHQLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHGLQ
$PHULFDQSROLWLFDOSUDFWLFHDQGHPEHGGHGLQ$PHULFDQFXOWXUH¶DQGIURPZKLFKLWLV
particularly difficult to deviate.   
 
Ron Krebs (e.g. 2005) has shown how foreign and security policy can become 
particularly dominant when its framings remove the discursive materials that potential 
opponents would require in order to formulate a socially sustainable counter-
argument and alternative.  Krebs and Lobasz (2009), for example, argue that, in late 
2002, Congressional Democrats were rhetorically coerced such that they chose to 
swallow lingering doubts and opt to vote for intervention in Iraq.  For Jackson and 
Bentley, in 2012, it is clear that these framings, alongside the political and cultural 
G\QDPLFV WKH\ KDYH LQGXFHG FRQWLQXH WR VWDFN WKH GHEDWH LQ IDYRXU RI 2EDPD¶V
political opponents.  After assessing the biased discursive playing field, the Obama 
Administration has frequently chosen to modify, rather than overhaul, the 
fundamentals of a War on Terror that is founded upon an engrained, resonant and 
enduring set of discourses.   The net result is the same in 2012 as it was in 2002; 
opponents of the War on Terror are left to contest relatively minor and procedural 
issues, leaving in tact the fundamental orientation of foreign and security policy.   
 
In Chapter 6, Ty Solomon adds to this theme, arguing that the War on Terror is a 
particularly useful example of rhetorical coercion due to the frequent and intense use 
of the language of national identity and foundational values, as well as the affective 
investment of Americans in such framings.  During the War on Terror, foreign policy 
has repeatedly been framed as more than simply something the state does; but rather, 
as helping to comprise what it is the state actually is.  Framed as an essential 
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component of the national Self, it becomes extremely difficult to contest foreign 
policy; as to do so would readily be equated with challenging widely supported 
understandings of the national identity.   6RORPRQ¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ LV WR UHYHDO KRZ
American commitments to the language of the War on Terror are often intensely 
emotional, making its overhaul particularly difficult (see also Solomon 2012).  
Obama, perhaps more than any other, has faced accusations of a lack of patriotism.  
During the War on Terror, failing to support narratives of interventionism ± in the 
name of freedom ± have readily been equated with a lack of love for country and even 
as an indication of threat to the Homeland.  During the War on Terror, the language of 
national identity and foundational values in foreign policy has helped to co-opt and 
curtail.  The (critical) constructivist argument posits that Obama is yet to fully break 
free from this powerful coercive logic.   
 
 
2%$0$¶6)2REIGN POLICY: ASSESSING CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 
:KHQ ZHLJKLQJ WKH µUHDOLW\¶ RI FKDQJH LQ SUDFWLFDO SROLF\ WHUPV ILQGLQJV RIWHQ
GHSHQGXSRQ WKHSDUWLFXODU VHFWRURI µIRUHLJQDQG VHFXULW\SROLF\¶ FKRVHQ IRU VWXG\
:LWKWKLV LQPLQG2EDPD¶VPL[HGUHFRUGRILmplementing change can usefully and 
KROLVWLFDOO\ EH DVVHVVHG WKURXJK WKUHH DUHDV LQ SDUWLFXODU KLV $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V
approach to nuclear weapons; counter-terrorism policy and in particular the use of 
unmanned aerial vehicles; and approaches to intervention and the use of force abroad.   
 
³There is little doubt that the election of Barack Obama to the United States 
presidency generated tremendous optimism about the possibility of substantive 
change in US foreign and domestic policy, including the US-led globDOZDURQWHUURU´
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-DFNVRQ+RZHYHU2EDPD¶VVHFRQGWHUPLQRIILFHEHJDQZLWKWURRSVVWLOO
stationed in Afghanistan: a war begun eleven years previously.  With drawdown of 
troops scheduled for 2013 and potentially 2014, Obama ran his 2012 re-election 
campaign as a wartime president, just as his predecessor had done.  However, 
2EDPD¶V PDMRU IRUHLJQ SROLF\ SRVLWLRQV ± his calls on war and intervention ± have 
demonstrated both continuity and change with those of George W. Bush. 
 
As Mike Aaronson argues in Chapter 7, in policy terms, the starkest difference 
between the forty-third and forty-fourth presidents is clearly found in their respective 
YLHZVRIWKHZDULQ,UDT2EDPDFDPHWRRIILFHRSSRVLQJWKHµGXPEZDU¶ZKLFKKH
VDZ DV GLYHUWLQJ $PHULFD¶s attention away from the area of the world in which its 
LQWHUHVWVZHUHPRVWREYLRXVO\HQJDJHG WKH$I3DNERUGHUUHJLRQ %XVK¶VSUHPDWXUH
GHFODUDWLRQRIµ0LVVLRQ$FFRPSOLVKHG¶DERDUGWKH866$EUDKDP/LQFROQZKLOVWVWLOO
not fully realised, has come closer during the Obama presidency, as American troops 
have returned home.  The critique that some liberals, Democrats, isolationists and 
pacifists have launched is that these troops were, relatively quickly, redeployed to 
ILJKWDQGGLHLQWKHRULJLQDOµZDU¶%XUNHDQGWKHILUVWIURQWRIWKH:DURQ
Terror. 
 
2EDPD¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRWKHZDULQ$IJKDQLVWDQKDVEHHQVWHDGIDVWLQFRPSDULVRQWR
his clear disdain for American involvement in Iraq.  That disdain, however, did not 
prevent Obama from learning some of the lessons that the war in Iraq held for the 
future deployment of American force in fighting counter-insurgency.  The success of 
the surge in Iraq was debated and deliberated for ninety days amongst Obama 
officials before finally it was adopted as a policy model designed to rescue the 
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Afghanistan mission through the restabilisation of the country.  Deploying 30000 
additional American troops, reinforced by an extra 10000 NATO troops, Obama 
agreed to raise total US troop levels to 100000, in an attempt to approximate the troop 
to territory ratio that had previously been seen to work for the British in Malaya and 
achieve partial stabilisation in Iraq, just as the conflict appeared to be veering out of 
control.   
 
As Wali Aslam argues in Chapter 8, Obama has also reshaped the political and 
geographical imagination of the Afghanistan conflict.  Viewing Pakistani cooperation 
warily, there has been no replication of the courting of General Pervez Musharraf 
conducted by Colin Powell and George Bush.  In contrast, Obama has explicitly 
UHFRQFHSWXDOLVHG $PHULFD¶V ZDU WR LQFOXGH 3DNLVWDQL WHUULWRU\ ± in particular the 
Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan, incorporating Tribal and Pashtun 
UHJLRQVDORQJ WKH$IJKDQERUGHU 2EDPD¶V:DURQ7HUURUXQOLNH%XVK¶VGoes not 
count or rely upon Pakistani assistance: it doubts it.  Pakistan is viewed and treated as 
WKUHDW QRW DOO\ LQ 2EDPD¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\  3DNLVWDQL RIILFLDOV DUH QRW LQIRUPHG RI
drone strikes against suspected terrorists within their borders, just as they were left 
naive of the operation to kill Osama bin Laden until after its successful conclusion.  
$V$VODPSRLQWVRXW2EDPD¶VSURFOLYLW\IRUWKHXVHRIGURQHVUHSUHVHQWVERWKFKDQJH
and continuity with the policy of the Bush Administration, who had ramped up their 
use from 2005 through to 2008 (Aslam 2011).  What is new is the frequency of drone 
strikes under Obama and the significance and notoriety they have developed as high 
profile targets have been prioritized over concerns for civilian casualties.   
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7KH OHVVRQV RI $IJKDQLVWDQ LQIRUPHG 2EDPD¶V WKLQNLQJ DV WKH HYHQWV RI WKH $UDE
Spring began to unfold.  The shifting context of US-Middle East relations ± from War 
on Terror to Arab Spring ± brought Obama his own war.  In Libya it was less 
immediately clear that the US national interest was best advanced through 
intervention.  The intervention was pursued, in significant part, as a war of choice and 
altruism, rather than utmost necessity.  It was initiated and legitimised, not by the 
United States but, principally, France and, to a lesser extent, Britain.  It could not, 
however, have been successfully conducted without American support and assistance.  
2EDPD¶V SROLF\ XQRIILFLDOO\ DW OHDVW ZDV WR OHDG IURP EHKLQG  7KHUH ZHUH VRPH
borrowed tactics, but WKHZDUZDV WUXH WR2EDPD¶VRZQSUHIHUUHGZDU-fighting style 
and foreign policy beliefs.  A broadly Afghan Model was used to inform and support 
indigenous forces on the ground, backed by overwhelming air power.  In contrast to 
his predecessor, Obama was always at pains to stress that there was zero possibility of 
American boots on the ground and that regime change was not an explicit goal of the 
LQWHUYHQWLRQ +ROODQG DQG $DURQVRQ   ,Q /LE\D 2EDPD¶V GHVLUH WR ILJKW WKH
good fight, and to fight it right, came together.  Libya was about fighting for the right 
reasons, but paying a limited cost and bearing a limited burden (Quinn 2011: 819).  It 
minimized the costs and risks to American life, by concentrating efforts on the lofty 
heights of exceptionalist rhetoric and American airpower.  It was the ideal type 
intervention of a slowly solidifying Obama Doctrine. 
 
,Q &KDSWHU  $QGUHZ )XWWHU H[SORUHV WKH 2EDPD $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V DSSURDFK WR
nuclear weapons.  Futter shows that, despite making considerable efforts to shift 
HVWDEOLVKPHQW WKLQNLQJ DERXW QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV D FORVH LQVSHFWLRQ RI 2EDPD¶V ILUVW
term approach to nuclear weapons reveals that many policy trajectories remain 
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broadly the same as those pursued by George W Bush.  Standing out and alone, as 
almRVWXQWKLQNDEOHXQGHUWKH%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQLV2EDPD¶V3UDJXHVSHHFKRQ
nuclear disarmament.  Initiatives in other areas of US nuclear policy reflect a 
surprising amount of continuity, for instance: the continuation of efforts towards 
strategic nuclear arms control with Russia and the signing of a New START Treaty, 
which follows on directly from the 2002 Moscow treaty agreed by the Bush 
administration; the broadening and formalising of proliferation control, such as the 
Bush era Proliferation Security Initiative and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism; and the expansion of policies to diversify US deterrence options, designed 
to combat Iranian and North Korean nuclear threats.  Therefore, while tactical shifts 
in the thinking behind nuclear policy have occurred ± in the direction of reducing the 
utility of nuclear weapons ± the strategic underpinnings of US nuclear strategy have 
not significantly altered from the path outlined and followed by the Bush 
administration. 
 
It has been a similar story, of course, in the fight against terrorism at home, where 
Obama has opted to repeatedly renew and extend the legislation that frames efforts to 
counter the domestic terror threat. Obama has repeatedly renewed both the State of 
Emergency, which has been in place since the onset of the War on Terror on 14 
September 2001, and the US Patriot Act, continuing the provision of sweeping 
powers for surveillance and wiretapping.  Obama enables this provision, as a number 
of contributors to this volume make clear, through his decision to continue to employ 
the language used by his predecessor in describing the omnipresent threat that looms 
over the American nation.  This comes despite what many commentators have hailed 
DV 2EDPD¶V JUHDWHVW IRUHLJQ SROLF\ DFKLHYHPHQt to date: the killing of Osama bin 
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Laden in Pakistan on 2 May 2011.  Despite being met with an outpouring of jubilation 
in the United States, and acting as an invaluable political shield from Republican 
DWWDFNV2EDPDKDVGHFOLQHGWRIUDPHELQ/DGHQ¶VGHDth as the beginning of the end of 
the War on Terror.  As Lee Jarvis notes in Chapter 10, while the event has contributed 
to the partial healing of a national wound, it has not come to mark a hard rupture in 
time from the inherited policies of George W. Bush and the War on Terror to those of 
Barack Obama and the Arab Spring. 
 
 
STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK 
The book adopts a comparative approach, analysing change and continuity in US 
IRUHLJQSROLF\GXULQJ%DUDFN2EDPD¶VILUVWWHUPLQRIILFHYLV-à-vis the foreign policy 
of the War on Terror, initiated by George W. Bush, following the events of September 
11th 2001.  The volume analyses the extent to which criticisms of continuity are 
correct, identifying how the failure to end the War on Terror is manifest and 
explaining the reasons that have made enacting change in foreign policy so difficult. 
7KHERRNWKHQDQVZHUVWZRSULQFLSDOTXHVWLRQV7RZKDWH[WHQWKDV2EDPD¶VIRUHLJQ
policy been characterised by change and/or continuity?  And, how can continuity in 
US foreign pROLF\VLQFH2EDPD¶VHOHFWLRQEHXQGHUVWRRGDQGH[SODLQHG" 
 
In addressing these questions, contributions to this volume discuss continuity and 
change from a range of perspectives in International Relations and Foreign Policy 
Analysis, which are broadly representative of a spectrum of theoretical positions.  The 
ERRNEHJLQV LQ LWV ILUVW VHFWLRQDQG&KDSWHUZLWK7UHYRU0F&ULVNHQ¶VDFFRXQWRI
volitional continuity, whereby Obama is seen to choose to reshape rather than 
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overhaul the War on Terror.  In Chapter 2, Adam Quinn considers systemic constraint 
in the form of relative American decline within the international system.  In Chapter 
3, Nicholas Kitchen explores economic and strategic re-alignment, through a broadly 
neo-classical realist analysis of shifting international and domestic imperatives.   
 
,QWKHERRN¶VVHFRQGVHFWLRQZHFRQVLGHUWKHUROHRILGHDVDQGLGHQWLW\DVDVWUXFWXUDO
limit to change.  In Chapter 4, Richard Jackson analyses the culturally embedded 
discourses of the War on Terror, emphasizing the institutionalised nature of the 
conflict.  Building on this, in Chapter 5, Michelle Bentley argues that rhetorical 
coercion continues to act as a cultural constraint on change, as understandings of 
terrorism in the media, popular culture and everyday life continue to encourage 
continuity.  In Chapter 6, Ty Solomon takes this argument further still in arguing that 
the emotional and affective investment of Americans in the war effort actively works 
against the possibility of greater change in US foreign policy.   
 
In the books third section, substantive policy areas are assessed, which represent three 
of the most significant issues the Obama Administration has faced in attempting to 
QHJRWLDWH*HRUJH%XVK¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\OHJDF\,Q&KDSWHU0LNHAaronson delivers 
DEURDGDVVHVVPHQWRI2EDPD¶VDSSURDFKWRZDULQWHUYHQWLRQDQGWKHXVHRIIRUFH,Q
&KDSWHU:DOL$VODPDQDO\VHV2EDPD¶VQRWRULRXVXVHRIGURQHVZLWKLQ$PHULFD¶V
overarching Pakistan policy.  In Chapter 9, Andrew Futter considers ObaPD¶VQXFOHDU
SROLF\)LQDOO\LQWKHERRN¶VIRXUWKVHFWLRQDQG&KDSWHU/HH-DUYLVUHIOHFWVRQWKH
QDWXUHRI DSSHDOV WR µWLPH¶ LQ2EDPD¶V IRUHLJQSROLF\ DQG LWV VWXG\ 7KLV WKHPH LV
also picked up in the Conclusion, which explores how we might conceptualise change 
 25 
and continuity in US foreign policy, as well as revisiting the related roles of volition 
and structural constraint. 
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